ATSB Cites Planning and Risk Control Failures in Sea Pelican Grounding
An ATSB investigation found that inadequate preparation, limited knowledge of an encroaching sandbank and insufficient risk controls contributed to the grounding of the tug Sea Pelican in Port Adelaide. The operator has since strengthened its safety management procedures.
The serious incident occurred on June 10, 2025, while Sea Pelican was operating with the barge Rocksea. The tug and barge combination was manoeuvring from the North Arm waterway into the Port Adelaide River in South Australia when the tug took a wide path during the turn and struck a sandbar.
The contact holed the tug’s shell plating, allowing water to enter the engine room. Bilge pumping was started, and Sea Pelican was slipped the following day to undergo repairs. No injuries were reported.
The ATSB found that preparations for the movement were not sufficient to ensure that the associated navigational risks had been properly assessed and addressed. According to Chief Commissioner Angus Mitchell, the masters aboard did not have accurate information about the boundaries of the encroaching sandbank and were unaware of how far it had reduced the width of the navigable channel.
The pre-departure process did not adequately assess the available channel width or treat the sandbank as a navigational hazard, the investigation concluded.
The report also identified shortcomings in the operator’s management of risks linked to tug-and-barge operations within the port. Maritime Constructions had not adequately identified and controlled the risks associated with operating such combinations in the area.
Pilotage arrangements were another focus of the investigation. Port regulations required the tug and barge combination to carry either a harbour pilot or a master holding a pilotage exemption. Sea Pelican’s master did not hold a pilotage exemption certificate, so a pilotage-exempt master was aboard during the operation.
However, the ATSB identified differing interpretations among company masters and pilotage-exempt masters regarding the role and responsibilities of the exemption holder. The operator’s documentation also did not define how the pilotage exemption certificate system was to be used.
Mitchell said that when a vessel is navigated in pilotage waters under the guidance of a pilotage exemption holder, the respective responsibilities of that person and the vessel’s master should be clearly defined in the company’s safety management system.
Following the grounding, Maritime Constructions updated its safety management system. The revisions strengthened procedures covering training, watchkeeping and passage planning.
The ATSB said the incident demonstrated the need for thorough preparation and a robust safety management system capable of identifying operational hazards and ensuring that effective controls are in place.